All US commercial airports are in the public sector yet not all have the same ownership type. For medium and large hub US airports we use stochastic frontier analysis to analyze the efficiency differences for alternative airport ownership types. We find that while form of ownership may matter for cost efficiency, in general its effect is relatively small. Yet type of public sector ownership does have cost efficiency implications in certain environments. Further, when heterogeneity is not controlled, the results change substantially so that type of ownership matters much more which demonstrates the importance of controlling for cross section heterogeneity.
I. Introduction
An we analyze the relative efficiency differences across four US commercial airport ownership types (city, county, state, airport authority); we distinguish airport specific heterogeneity due to cost efficiency and, separately, to factors other than efficiency; and we perform a series of counterfactual analyses to analyze the efficiency effects of local ownership, hub size, and multiple airport metropolitan areas.
Based on a single output scenario, where the output is number of departures, our main findings are summarized as follows. First, conditioning on medium hub airports in multi-airport cities, airports owned by city or airport/port authorities have 9.59% (at median) higher variable costs due to cost inefficiency compared to county or state-owned airports. Second, among the medium hub airports owned by the city or airport/port authorities, those in multiple-airport cities have 8.6% (at median) higher variable costs relative to those in single-airport cities. 1 Third, there is not much effect on cost efficiency between medium and large hubs.
Inspired by Hicks' (1935) quiet life hypothesis, we examined the effect of multiple airports in a metropolitan area. 2 For the sample of airports, we find that the median cost efficiency for single-airport and multi-airport cities is 88.2% and 86.9%, respectively, a negligible efficiency difference. 3 In general, when we control for airport specific heterogeneity, the median cost efficiency for the whole sample is 87.6%, which is not very sensitive to ownership type. In sum, it seems that while the form of ownership may not have much effect on cost efficiency individually, their combination may alter cost efficiency levels. The average variable cost differences mostly stem from differences in scale economies for different ownership types. The outcome dramatically changes, however, when we do not control for airport specific heterogeneity. For example, the median cost efficiency for airports with and without local (i.e. city or airport authority) ownership is 80% and 92.6%, respectively. The difference is more dramatic for large and medium hubs (47.3% and 99.5%, respectively). It appears that when not controlling for heterogeneity, the 1 Cost efficiency is used in the standard stochastic frontier literature language. That is, it is the ratio of the frontier minimum cost to observed cost. A potential reason for such deviation is the principle agent problem that the objectives of administrators may not fully align with cost minimization. Another reason may be optimization mistakes that are done by the decision makers. 2 Quiet life hypothesis claims that, holding other factors constant, higher competition increases cost efficiency. 3 Note that efficiency is a relative concept. That is, the efficiency estimates are based on comparison to the best practice. However, since the efficiency is captured by a random component the highest efficiency estimate is not necessarily equals to 100%. When the number of observations is large it may be reasonable to assume that the best practice firm is on the frontier.
intrinsic characteristics of the airports that are not captured by the existing control variables may be misinterpreted as inefficiency/efficiency in costs.
II. Relevant Literature
Arbrate and Erbetta (2010) and Voltes-Dorta and Lei (2013) provide excellent summaries of the increasing body of research on airport costs, efficiency, productivity, and type of ownership.
Although similar to the literature cited in these studies, Table 1 complements these literature reviews in focusing on airport ownership and identifying specific results that relate to alternative ownership types. In general, the bulk of the research reported in Table 1 , particularly more recent research, indicates that private ownership is more efficient than public ownership. However, this is a broad generalization and the reported studies also indicate that the effect of ownership depends on a number of factors related to the competitive environment.
In Privatization enhances efficiency but 100% government ownership is preferred to mixed ownership. More than 90% probability that city/state airports more efficient than those owned/operated by airport authorities The general result that privatization enhances efficiency relative to public sector ownership is a 'proof of concept' result, consistent with economic theory. In order to better understand the relationship between types of airport ownership and efficiency, there is a growing body of research that is looking at underlying characteristics of specific types of airport ownership. Two avenues of research focus on regulation and airport use agreements.
Assaf, Gillen, and Barros (2012) finds that airline deregulation (i.e. a competitive airline sector) combined with a competitive airport sector precludes the need for airport regulation.
Consistent with this, Craig, Airola, and Tipu's (2012) analyzes two types of public ownership, airport authorities and city-owned. Consistent with Zhao, Choo, and Oum (2014), the study finds that airport authorities are 40% technically more efficient than city airports. However, the study also finds that labor and materials inputs at airport authorities capture the bulk of these savings leading to a net cost advantage over city ownership of less than 5%.
Adding to the literature, this study uses stochastic frontier analysis to analyze the cost efficiency implications of public sector ownership for 50 large and medium hub airports in the US.
In addition to including all types of commercial airport ownership -city, county, state, and authority -this study includes multiple-airport systems. A modeling contribution is that the analysis explicitly controls for airport specific heterogeneity. This is important because, in the absence of such controls, differences across airports may be due to factors other than efficiency.
That is, efficiency estimates may incorrectly capture airport specific heterogeneity.
III. Econometric Model for Cost Function and Efficiency Estimation
Consistent with Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck VC is the deterministic part of variable cost when the airport is fully efficient and is a function of output, input prices, and a quasi-fixed factor of production. In Section IV where we describe our data and Section V where we present estimation results, the specific variables used in our empirical model will be discussed. We assume that 
In addition, we assume that
Conventional cost function estimation includes input share equations in order to improve statistical efficiency. In a SFA setting, this might raise concerns because the it u term captures the combined effect of technical and allocative efficiency, and a misallocation of inputs (i.e. allocative inefficiency) might affect input share equations in a non-trivial way. Kumbhakar and Wang (2006) demonstrate that directly modeling allocative inefficiency from the cost minimization problem generates a complicated form of heterogeneity which can bias the parameter estimates, i.e. uit in Equation (1) is heteroskedastic even when the allocative inefficiency is modeled as homoscedastic in the cost minimization problem.
As this is an unresolved issue in the SFA literature, we model overall inefficiency in a reduced form framework. That is, we model the cost of inefficiency, it u , directly rather than modeling misallocation of inputs at the cost minimization stage. Equation (2) gives the system of equations and distribution assumptions for our empirical model,
where it S and * it S are vectors of observed and optimal input shares, respectively. Parameter estimates are obtained by maximizing the log-likelihood function
, where the loglikelihood value for unit at time corresponding to Equation (2) is:
 is the cumulative distribution function for the standard normal distribution, 
Efficiency and Heterogeneity
In recent SFA analyses (focused on the U.S. banking industry) Almanidis (2013) and Almanidis, Karakaplan, and showed that the efficiency estimates under the assumption that all firms share the same technology differed considerably from those obtained from models assuming multiple technology groups. 6 Hence, if there are technological (and other productive unit specific) differences and such differences are ignored, then a relatively efficient firm with less advanced technology can be misinterpreted as less efficient than its actual efficiency level. For example, comparing the government institutions with private institutions under the assumption that they share the same technology/frontier might be inappropiate.
Only recently has the SFA literature begun to address the heterogeneity among productive units that is due to factors other than inefficiency. One approach, as noted above, to capture heterogeneity due to technological differences includes technology-group specific dummy variables which, for our variable cost function model, implies that the technological differences are captured by parallel shifts in the cost frontier. A more general way to model different technologies would assume a full set of different parameters for each technology group but this has significiant data implications. A second approach (Barros (2008) models heterogeneity by a random effects model. 7 And a third approach captures heterogeneity unrelated to inefficiency by including fixed effects dummy variables (Greene 2005a (Greene , 2005b ). Greene calls this estimator the true fixed effects estimator. Given that the first approach may not be sufficient to capture airport specific heterogeneity and given the greater potential for additional endogenerity in the random effects model, the present study follows Greene's fixed effects specification for controlling heterogeneity and weight of aircraft, mix of aircraft using the airport, altitude, and environmental impacts U.S. DOT, FAA, Advisory Circular AC No: 150/5325-4B, July 1, 2005). Further, adoption of new technologies (e.g. NextGen) will not occur simultaneously for all airports. Other examples include airports' land use decisions in the runway protection zone. Airports must coordinate with the FAA Office of Airports regarding land use and structures (e.g. schools), recreation, transportation (e.g. rail and parking), and fuel and hazardous materials storage (FAA Memorandum, September 27, 2012), all of which reflect a rich mix of technologies. In our empirical model, these and other technology differences are captured by the productive unit specific dummy variables. Hence, the productive units share the same parameter values except the constant term (i.e., fixed effects). 7 If the heteroegeneity is correlated with the inefficiency term or regressors, the random effects model will produce inconsistent parameter and efficiency estimates. This implies that random effects models, in stochastic frontier framework, are more prone to a potential endogeneity problem compared with the conventional random effects models. That is, the error term for efficiency introduces additional sources of endogeneity.
unrelated to inefficiency. That is, we include panel unit specific dummy variables when modelling * ln it VC . This is one of the other differences between our study and those of Zhao, Choo, and Oum (2014) and Craig, Airola, and Tipu (2011), which do not control for such heterogeneity. 8 Hence, in theory, airport specific heterogeneity may have biased these studies' efficiency estimates in a non-systematic way. In the empirical section, we present evidence supporting such biases for the cost efficiency estimates for US airports.
IV. Sample and Data Sources
The sample for the analysis includes all medium and large hub airports in the contiguous United States for the thirteen year period 1996 -2008 and for which data were consistently available during the period. Appendix II identifies the airports included in the analysis, the airport's hub status, whether the airport is part of a multi-airport system and, if so, whether airport ownershlip is common across airports. 9 The output measure for the study is airline departures. 10 The divided by capacity for a 10,000' by 150' runway, which can generally accommodate any size commercial aircraft. At the mean, the sample airports had 3.5 actual runways and 3.13 ENSRs. Finally, the model controls for other factors that studies have found to affect airport costs.
The share of international departures, defined as the ratio of number of international departures and total number of departures for an airport, accounts for additional costs associated with international flights. And the share of freight, defined as the ratio of freight weight and the sum of freight and passenger weight (assuming that a passenger (along with their luggage) is equivalent to 220 pounds of cargo), captures the extent to which cargo operations affect airport costs. In addition, the FAA CATS provides data on non-aeronautical revenues that the airport derives from parking and retail activities. The model includes two variables, the share of total non-aeronautical revenues from parking and retail activities, to reflect these terminal service activities.
13 Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for airport departures, costs, input shares, price indices, and some control variables.
14 The analysis includes four ownership categories, city (36%), airport/port authority (44%), county (16%), and state (4%). For the full sample, Table 2, provides descriptive statistics for departures, in total, by ownership, and whether the airport is part of a multiple airport system, as well as total costs, input shares and the quasi-fixed capital.
For the sample as a whole, airports handled an average 129,368 departures and incurred $111.76 million in costs to operate the airport and conduct its varied activities. Airports expended on average 37.9%, 39.8%, and 22.3% of operating costs on personnel, contractual/maintenance, and general operations (i.e. all other operating expenses). As expected, there was greater variation in departures, costs, and cost shares across airports than across time. On the other hand, there was 13 Rather than including these variables to control for the effects of cargo and non-aeronautical terminal activities, an alternative approach specifies cargo (or cargo-related variable) and non-aeronautical revenues as airport outputs in a multi-product cost function (e.g. Oum, Yan, and Yu (2008), Botasso and Conti (2012)). When estimating a SFA model with airport fixed effects, a single output with control variables for cargo and non-aeronautical was more robust than a multi-output specification. 14 There are 649 rather than 650 observations in the sample because the Bergstrom International Airport in Austin, Texas was not operational until 1997. Quasi-Fixed Capital Equivalent Number of 10,000' x 150' runways 649 3.128 Table 2 also reports departure movements and costs for multi-airport systems where, on average, an airport as part of a multi-airport system handles more than the sample average number of departures. But this also depends on whether the airport is jointly governed. An airport in the sample that is part of a multi-airport system under common or joint ownership handles nearly 180,000 departures in comparison with 131,732 departures that an airport handles when part of a multi-airport system that is not under joint ownership. Whereas an airport under common ownership handles 35% more departures, these airports have 74.2% higher operating expenses, suggesting diseconomies associated with joint ownership.
Significant operating and cost differences also exist between large and medium hub airports. The average number of departures at large hubs is 2.7 times greater, 185,030 versus 68,874 at medium hub airports. But large hub airports incur costs that are nearly 4 times higher than medium hubs, $173.7 versus $44.4 million. Accentuating this difference even more, a large hub airport that is part of a multi-airport system handles five times as many departures than a medium hub counterpart but it does so at nearly nine times the cost ($249.7 versus $31.6 million). 15 The standard deviation of the real price of personnel, contractual/maintenance, and general operations was 6.29, 1.69, and 1.74 across airports but 39.8, 96.5, and 86.5 across time. Table 3 reports three sets of maximum likelihood estimation results: 1) a Benchmark model, which includes fixed effects that controls for airport specific heterogeneity; 2) a No-fixedeffects model, which doesn't include fixed effects; and 3) a Passenger model, which controls for airport specific heterogeneity but number of passengers as the output measure. 16 In each model, Contractual, Repair/Maintenance is the input share equation dropped. From the table, the explanatory variables that induce heterogenerity (the zit vector in Section III) includes a constant term, the quasi-fixed factor of production ( k / k ln it ) and its square, a time trend and its square, and dummy variables for large hub, local airport ownership, presence of multiple airports in the geographic area, and joint ownership where the same entity (e.g. New York-New Jersey Port Authority) owns and is responsible for the operations. 17 A priori, the models satisfy linear homogeneity in prices and factor price symmetry. In the benchmark model, the monotonicity and concavity conditions are satisfied at almost all points (3 violations out of 649 observations). 18 Compared to conventional cost function estimation, regularity conditions are more important for the stochastic frontier models. Sauer, Frohberg, and Hockmann (2006) note that theoretically inconsistent frontiers over-or understate the inefficiency, which could result in counterproductive policy measures. Without controlling for heterogeneity by airport fixed effects, as suggested by Greene (2005) , the regularity conditions are violated (about 13.1% (85/649) violation rate in our case). 19 Moreover, the likelihood ratio test rejects the 16 See the Appendix I for more details about variables. 17 Output and input prices were demeaned using each airport's average for the sample period. Demeaning for the quasi-fixed factor was based upon the sample average due to limited variation in runway capacity across airports. 18 *To facilitate reading the table, the first instance of q, k, l, and e identifies the variables name.
V. Estimation Results
the length of panel is 15 they mention that the finite sample properties are very good. In our data set the number of time periods is 13, which seems to be reasonably large enough to avoid the effects of incidental parameters problem. Operations, respectively. 20 The model in Table 3 includes a term that is the product of output measure (
) and a dummy variable Local that equals 1 if the city or an airport/port authority owns the airport and 0 otherwise. This captures technological differences that may exist for airports locally governed relative to airports governed at a more aggregate county or state level. 21 Also included in the model is the product of it q and ENSR (the capital measure
, and Top10ENSR, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the airport is among the top 10 airports in terms of the quasi-fixed factor of production. 22 Without this term the marginal cost estimates for these airports were negative for 4.2% (27/649) of the observations. 23 This may be 20 These variables are further normalized to assure homogeneity in prices. See Appendix I for further details about acronyms and transformations applied to the variables, i.e., log-demean, demean, or no transformation. 21 Prior estimations could not reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients for city and airport authority ownership were equal and that state and county ownership types be the reference category. 22 As mentioned earlier, relative to standard translog models, non-negative marginal costs (i.e., monotonicity with respect to output) and curvature regularity conditions (i.e., concavity with respect to input prices) are more important for stochastic frontier models. Further, a likelihood ratio test based upon the reported model and a model that excluded the product of it it k q and Top10ENSR rejected the null hypothesis that the model omit this term. 23 We also tried Top5ENSR and Top15ENSR dummy variables, which are dummies for top 5 and top 15 airports. While the median efficiency levels were very close, the regularity condition are violated more than 5.2% and 4.2%, respectively. Moreover, the log likelihood value for Top10ENSR was higher. This is in line with our heuristic choice for top 10 airports. attributed to the fact that some of the airports have particularly higher capital levels relative to the median airport. This additional term gives us the flexibility to capture this pattern. On average, these airports had 2.7 more ENSRs (5. 
Robustness Checks
In order to check the robustness of our results to choice of output the third model in Table   3 uses passengers rather than departures as the output measure. The results are similar except for some relatively small differences in the output-related variables. For example, the median for returns to capacity utilization were 2.56, lower than the 3.56 using departures.
As a second robustness check, we define MAP in our analysis by the presence of multiple airports in the same metropolitan statistical area. For our sample, a notable exception is Baltimore/Washington International (BWI) which is not part of the Washington metropolitan statistical area but it is only 33 miles driving distance from Washington DC. In order to check the robustness of our results to the definition of MAP variable, we used an alternative multiple-airport variable, MAPalt, that included BWI and Washington the DC airports, San Diego and LongBeach-Los Angeles, Austin-Bergstrom International and San Antonio, and Indianapolis and Cincinnati-Northern Kentrucky as part of a multiple airport system. Appendix II identifies the MAPalt variable and Appendix III reports the regression results. 24 A third robustness check focused on the definition of a hub airport. This analysis uses the FAA definition which identifies a hub airport by the number of annual passenger boardings. Rather than a size-based measure of hub, a competitive-based measure (often used in market analyses) focuses on airlines that have established hub operations at various airports. In exploring this, for all FAA-defined large hubs in the sample, with the exception of Las Vegas, the airport serves as a hub for some airline. To evaluate whether this affects our results, we define an alternative dummy variable for large hubs (HubMkt). The HubMkt variable equals 1 if an airport is a large hub by the FAA definition and also serves as a hub for an airline. By this definition, HubMkt equals 0 for Nevada McCarran (LAS) because this is not a hub airport for any airline. In Appendix III, we report the regression outputs using this variable. 25 The results in Table 3 indicate short run returns to scale, with a median value for the sample equal to 3.56. 26 Own price input demand elasticities are negative and price inelastic for Personnel (-0.94) and Contractual, Repair/Maintenance (-0.83).
For General Airport Operations, demand is price elastic (-3.93), which reflects the many and varied types of airport activities in this category. Estimated cross price elasticities indicate that General Airport Operations is a substitute for Personnel and Contractual, Repair/Maintenance but that Personnel and Contractual, Repair/Maintenance are complements in production. Also, the 24 A reviewer correctly noted that BWI, although not in the same metropolitan statistical area, is likely in the same multi-airport market for airline travel. To explore the effects of this, we used distance and popular (i.e.newspaper) accounts of the markets to identify the four groupings. 25 Although FAA defined and market-based hubs are highly correlated, this is less true for medium hubs. In the sample, twelve medium hubs, by FAA's definition, do not serve as airline or market-based hubs. Using the market-based definition, the reference category for the hub variable is now non-large hubs included in the sample rather than medium hubs. 26 coefficients for the time trend and its square in the inefficiency term indicate that during the sample period airport inefficiencies decreased until 2003 and increased afterwards. 27 
Airport Ownership and Heterogeneity
In order to get some understanding of the cost efficiency implications of airport ownership and other operational-related indicators, we identified a benchmark counterfactual and then calculated the impact on costs when one or more indicators are present. Column (2)) set to one. For example, for the first row and third column (Multi-Airport MSA), Multi-Airport MSA dummy is set to one and Large Hub dummy is set to zero. 
Benchmark Counterfactual
The benchmark results indicate that none of the four indicator types as a single differentiator, is dominant in cost efficiency. 29 Locally governed airports only have 1.02% lower average variable costs (due to cost efficiency) than county or state-owned airports. And separate ownership of multiple airports within a MSA leads to a 1.91% cost reduction. The MAVC for a 29 In the Benchmark scenario, the number of observations used to calculate the percentage change is 221, 26, 0, and 39 (i.e., no observations and identified by the '-'s in the table.). For example, the number of observations which are local ownership but not multiairport or large hub is 221. Similarly, the number of observations which are hub but not multiairport or local ownership is 39. n/a
Conditioning Indicators
Counterfactual Scenarios county/state-owned airport that is a large hub and the only commercial airport in the MSA, is only 1.22% lower than a similarly situated medium hub airport.
Conditioning Counterfactuals
The underlying assumptions for Columns (2) - (4) are the same as for the benchmark counterfactuals except that the results are now conditioned on one of the other indicator variables.
From the results, we see that the effect of Local Ownership on average variable cost due to cost efficiency changes considerably when the airport is in a multi-airport MSA, -1.02% versus 9.59%.
However, the magnitude of change in MAVC (due to cost efficiency) of Local Ownership remains similar (1.56%) when the airport is a large hub. Also, there are mixed results in MAVC of MultiAirport MSA depending on the type of ownership. Multi-Airport MSA ownership is most (negatively) effective in cost efficiency when accompanied by local ownership (8.6% more variable costs). (2012)). 30 Efficiency is given as percentages and monetary unit is the US dollar.
Other Results
For the overall sample, Column (1) indicates that airports have an estimated 87.6% cost efficiency. But depending on hub size and airport ownership, cost efficiency ranges from a low of 85.2% for Multi-Airport Joint Ownership MSA to a high of 88.6% for airports that the county or 30 Efficient Marginal Cost = Marginal Cost*Efficiency. Note that median of MC and EMC may not come from the same airport-time pair. The percentage difference in MC and EMC medians, ranging from 13%-25% is relatively high but this does not necessarily translate to efficiency differences. The absence of coordinating benefits in multiple airport MSAs is also apparent in Table 5 .
Jointly governed airports have 30% higher average variable costs relative to separately governed airports.
VII. Concluding Comments
This study aims to add to the growing literature on public sector ownership and its impact on costs. Even though all US commercial airports are in the public sector, not all commercial public sector airports may be equally efficient. At the same time, the counterfactual analysis identifies specific situations in which local ownership at the city or airport/port authority level does matter and leads to lower cost efficiency.
When located in multi-airport MSAs, locally governed airports have average costs that are 8%-9%
higher relative to comparable airports in a single airport MSA. This result is consistent with the work of Martin and Voltes-Dorta (2011) and Martin, Roman, and Voltes-Dorta (2009) that found higher unit costs in multi-relative to single airport cities and with coordinating difficulties associated with jointly-run airports such as the New York-New Jersey Port Authority.
The current study raises a number issues for further research. One, expanding the data set to the most recent year and including large, medium, and small hubs would increase the number of observations, which would enable a richer set of empirical specifications. In particular, the conditioning results for multi-airport and jointly governed airports include a small number of airports. Enlarging the sample to include more airports would inform on whether the conditioning effects are representative. Two, and related, this study estimates a relatively high estimate for returns to capacity utilization, consistent with McCarthy (2014) using the same data but higher than estimates from other studies. A richer set of data and analyses would help identify reasons for these differences and is a fruitful area of research as it has important investment and policy implications. Third, this study focuses on forms of ownership. Complementing these data with detailed information the extent to which airport management is outsourced would provide important insights on why alternative forms of ownership affect costs. Fourth, what specific roles do federal, state, and local regulations have in creating a competitive environment and affecting airport operations and costs? Fifth, in our study we model heterogeneity via airport dummies. In general, the heterogeneity may change over time or it may be determined through a particular variable that is "measuring" intrinsic differences of airports . With our data set such an analysis was not feasible. However, if the data set is extended to have more time periods, such an analysis may provide a more accurate analysis of the relationship between ownership type and efficiency. Last, an underlying assumption is that US commercial airports seek cost efficiency.
Understanding the extent to which publicly-owned airports pursue other goals and how this affects cost efficiency by ownership type and vis-à-vis private ownership would provide additional insights on the trade-off between cost efficiency and these other goals. 
